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INTRODUCTION 
On June 11, 2013, a district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
denied Defendant Warner Chilcott’s motion to dismiss in the ongoing 
pharmaceutical litigation suit, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Warner 
Chilcott Public Limited Co.1  The Plaintiff in the suit, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 
alleged that when Warner Chilcott “switched the market” for their acne drug, 
Doryx, from tablets to capsules, solely to avoid generic competition, it 
engaged in “product hopping” and broke the antitrust laws.2  In its order, 
denying Warner Chilcott’s motion-to-dismiss, the court stated that because 
the defendant’s antitrust defense required it to consider facts that were well 
outside the complaint, it could not address the defendant’s arguments 
“without going beyond the pleadings.”3 
However, although the court denied Warner Chilcott’s motion to dismiss, 
its characterization of Mylan’s product hopping theory as “‘novel’ at best” 
and failing to state “an antitrust injury”4 is troubling in light of the precedent.  
While the “court’s dismissal decision” sends a “promising sign to those who 
oppose antitrust scrutiny” of regulatory gaming in general and product 
hopping in particular, it “does little to clarify the law.”5  Moreover, the court’s 
stance on product hopping can have grave consequences for consumers, 
health care plans, and the government if the court ultimately refuses to submit 
Warner Chilcott’s conduct to antitrust scrutiny. 
In this Note, I explain how product hopping—making non-substantial 
changes to branded drugs to delay the entry of generic alternatives to the 
market—is a form of regulatory gaming. Product hopping defeats the intended 
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which was intended to expedite 
competition and the entry of generics.6  Although in Mylan, no branded-drug 
patent is implicated, product hopping can occur even when a patent is in force 
and a generic competitor challenges it as invalid.7  In such a case, a brand firm 
 
1. Order on Motion to Dismiss, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 12-
3824 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 12, 2013), [hereinafter Mylan Order on Motion to Dismiss] (denying motion). 
2. Id. at 2. 
3. Id. at 3–4 (stating that “[d]efendants’ Motions are premature. Although I am skeptical that 
the “product hopping” alleged here constitutes anticompetitive conduct . . . I cannot definitively 
address that question without going beyond the pleadings.”). 
4. Id. at 3 (stating that “[d]efendants’ contentions, if correct, appear compelling.  I agree that 
Plaintiffs’ theory here is ‘novel’ at best.”) 
5. M. Sean Royall, Ashley E. Johnson & Jason C. McKenney, Antitrust Scrutiny of 
Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping,” 28 ANTITRUST 71, 75 (2013) [hereinafter Royall]. 
6. See Lisa Barons Pensabene et al., Hatch-Waxman: An Overview, PRAC. L. COMPANY 
(2013), http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/Hatch-Waxman%20Act%20
Overview%20lpensabene_dgregory.pdf. 
7. See Mylan Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1. 
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can manipulate Hatch-Waxman’s regulatory framework to increase the 
amount of litigation and Food & Drug Administration (FDA) delay in 
approving the generic alternative to the detriment of consumers.  Therefore, 
the consequences of the court’s final decision in Mylan has implications 
reaching far beyond the facts of the suit to cases where invalid patents in 
combination with product hopping could hold up generic entry. 
This Note is organized as follows.  In Part I, I begin by describing the 
Hatch-Waxman regulatory framework, state drug substitution laws, and 
pharmaceutical product hopping.  In Part II, I state the relevant facts and 
procedural history of the Mylan case, and describe the district court’s decision 
and reasoning.  In Part III, I present the legal background in this area before 
Mylan.  In Part IV, I analyze whether Mylan’s sought generic entry to the 
market was indeed free-riding as Warner Chilcott characterizes it, and 
whether Warner Chilcott’s conduct sought to manipulate the Hatch-Waxman 
regulatory framework and frustrate Congress’s stated intent. 
I. THE HATCH-WAXMAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND PRODUCT HOPPING 
In this Part, I describe the regulatory framework established by Hatch-
Waxman and state drug substitution laws.  Congress enacted the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984—commonly known as 
the Hatch-Waxman Act8—in 1984 in order to “facilitate market entry of low-
cost generics while incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to invest in 
developing new drugs.”9  Moreover, all fifty states have passed laws that 
allow pharmacists to substitute a generic when presented with a prescription 
for its branded equivalent, unless a physician directs, or the patient requests 
otherwise.10  These state substation laws together with Hatch-Waxman “create 
a regulatory framework designed to reduce costs to consumers by lowering 
 
8. Brief of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Professors as Amici Curiae at 3, Mylan 
Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co. (E.D. Pa. Jun. 12, 2013) (No. 12-3824) [hereinafter 
Professors Amicus] (citing 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 355 (2006))). 
9. The Hatch-Waxman Act’s legislative history “confirms that the Act was intended to 
mitigate the ‘serious anti-competitive effects’ of FDA rules on generic drug approval and prevent the 
‘practical extension of the monopoly position of the patent holder beyond the expiration of the 
patent.’” Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 3 n.5 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), pt. 1, at 4 
(1984)).  The Act safeguards patent rights by affording a patent holder the opportunity to trigger a 
30-month stay on FDA approval of a generic drug so that it may attempt to enforce its patents 
through litigation. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)).  It also provides a term extension for 
human drug products subject to FDA approval.  A patent’s term can be extended by a maximum of 
five years or fourteen years of effective patent life, whichever is less, for the time the FDA was 
reviewing the first drug application.  Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 156). 
10. Brief for Fed’l Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae at 6, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner 
Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 12-3824  [hereinafter FTC Amicus]. 
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generic costs.”11  This pairing “have been remarkably successful in facilitating 
generic competition and generating large savings for patients” and third-party 
payers.12 
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
“Congress enacted Hatch-Waxman in response to the high costs of 
pharmaceuticals resulting from patent monopolies on branded drugs and 
delayed generic entry.”13  Previously, generics faced limited incentives to 
enter a market because of the need for expensive duplicative testing.14  As a 
result, branded drugs continued to reap monopoly profits long after patents 
expired because of the effective extension of their monopoly term.  Congress 
therefore sought to increase the availability of generics to reduce both 
healthcare costs and the high percentage of individual incomes spent on 
pharmaceuticals.15  “The Supreme Court recently confirmed that Hatch-
Waxman’s purpose was to ‘speed the introduction of low-cost generic drugs 
to market, thereby furthering drug competition.’”16  A central provision of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is the introduction of the Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) procedure for generic manufacturers.17 
1. Abbreviated New Drug Application Procedure 
To introduce a new drug to market, a pharmaceutical company must 
 
11. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 3 n.5 (citation omitted). 
12. In 2012 alone, the use of generic drugs saved consumers $217 billion. Professors Amicus, 
supra note 8, at 3 n.8 (citations omitted); see also C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning 
Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L. J. 947, 952 
(2011) (stating that “once multiple generic firms enter the market, prices fall, often dramatically” and 
providing supporting empirics to show that prices for a cholesterol reducing drug dropped from $150 
pre-generic entry to $7 post-entry). 
13. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 4.  In 1983 alone, the Federal Government spent $2.4 
billion for drugs through Medicaid and in veterans and military hospitals.  Ronald Reagan, U.S. 
President, Remarks on Signing S. 1538 Into Law (Sep. 24, 1984)).  Congress noted that prices of 
generic versions of ten popular drugs were “on average 50 [%] less than their brand name 
equivalent[s].”  Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 4, n.10 (citation omitted). 
14. Id. at 4; see also id. at 4 n.11 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), pt. 1, p. 4 (1984) (stating 
that “the inability of generics to obtain approval . . . without enormous expenditures of money for 
duplicative tests” resulted in a practical extension of the patent monopoly)).  Moreover, earlier the 
Carter administration had urged Congress to act because “the requirements of duplicative tests on 
humans unnecessarily endangered human health.” Id. at 4 n.11 (citation omitted).  
15. The legislative history states that the reduction in drug prices would be “especially 
important to the poor, the under-insured, and the elderly.  The government itself, as purchaser of 
prescription drugs, [would] also save money as a result.” H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), pt. 1, p. 29 
(1984). 
16. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 4 (citing FTC v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2228 
(2013)). 
17. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II) (1984). 
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provide detailed evidence of safety and efficacy tests, and also a listing of any 
relevant patents.18  Hatch-Waxman expedites the approval process for 
generics that follow a branded drug.19  “Rather than submitting full safety and 
efficacy data, a generic manufacturer can obtain FDA approval by filing an 
ANDA, which certifies the bioequivalence of the generic to an existing 
branded drug.”20  Once approved, the generic receives an “AB-rating,” which 
allows pharmacists to substitute the generic when presented with a 
prescription for the branded product.21 
2. Patent Suits and ANDA Stays 
However, to protect the rights of patent holders, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
also requires generic manufacturers to identify any patents potentially relevant 
to their ANDA.22  The patentee then has forty-five days to sue for 
infringement.23  A patent suit at this stage leads to an automatic thirty-month 
stay of the ANDA.24  The FDA has no mandate or discretion to reduce this 
stay.25  Only a final court judgment of non-infringement or invalidity can 
truncate the stay.26  As Professor Hovenkamp points out, “The effect of this 
rather remarkable rule is to delay drug price competition for several years 
even when a patent is clearly invalid, by granting what is akin to an automatic 
preliminary injunction whenever a pharmaceutical patent owner files suit 
against a generic manufacturer.”27 
 
18. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 685, 709–10 n.99 (2009) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley] (internal citations omitted).  From 
animal testing and clinical trials, through full FDA approval, the process for drug approval can take 
up to ten years. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2008).  
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(A) (requiring that the approval process be completed within 180 
days of the filing of the application). 
20. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 5; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). 
21. Demystifying Generic Substitution: Knowing the Law, 2013 PHARMACIST’S LETTER 
(2013) http://pharmacistsletter.therapeuticresearch.com/ce/ceCourse.aspx?cs=&s=PL&pv=1&pc=13-
307&quiz=&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (“In order for a drug to have an AB rating, the drug 
must . . . show that it is therapeutically equivalent (meaning that it is bioequivalent AND 
pharmaceutically equivalent) to the reference drug.”). 
22. 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (requiring the generic manufacturer to certify one of the 
following: (1) no relevant patent is listed; (2) the patent is expired; (3) the ANDA only seeks 
approval after the expiration date of the patent; or (4) the ANDA does not infringe the patent or the 
patent is invalid). 
23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
25. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 711. 
26. Id. 
27. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, IP & ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS 
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.3, at 22 (Supp. 2010) 
[hereinafter Hovenkamp et al.]. 
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B. State Drug Substitution Laws 
Around the same time that Hatch-Waxman was passed, all 50 states 
passed drug substitution laws designed to lower prices for consumers.28  
These laws allow—and in many cases require—pharmacists, in the absence of 
a doctor’s contrary instructions, to substitute generic versions of brand-name 
prescriptions.29  State drug substitution laws are designed to address the 
disconnect in the industry between prescribing doctors, who are not directly 
responsive to drug pricing, and paying insurers and consumers, who do not 
directly select the prescribed drug.30  State drug substitution laws therefore 
carve out a role for pharmacists, who are much more sensitive to prices than 
doctors. 
However, the Hatch-Waxman Act and state substitution laws have created 
a complex regulatory framework with certain loopholes that can enable brand 
firms to game the system in a way that extends their period of exclusivity, to 
the detriment of the public and generic rivals.31  The FDA has neither the 
mandate nor the power to close these loopholes because it does not consider 
generic competition concerns when approving new products.32  One strategy 
brand firms have turned to is product-hopping, making non-substantial 
changes to their branded products and taking advantage of the resulting time 
required for FDA approval to impede generic substitution and exclude 
competition.33 
C. Pharmaceutical Product Hopping 
When brand firms are faced with the possibility of generic competition 
once a patent expires or is held invalid, they can make trivial alterations to 
their approved drugs, get FDA approval for those trivial alterations, and then 
replace the old product with the new product.34  For example, a brand firm 
might switch from selling a drug in capsule form to selling the same 
formulation of the same drug as a tablet.  While the change will not matter 
 
28. Michael A. Carrier, A Real World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing 
Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 109, 1017 (2010). 
29. Id. 
30. FTC Amicus at 6 (“The physician—who selects the drug product but does not pay for it – 
has little incentive to consider price when deciding which drug to prescribe.”). 
31. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 709. 
32. Id.; Hovenkamp et al., § 15.3, at 79 (stating that “[m]aking matters worse, the [FDA] 
regulators can do nothing to thwart this obvious abuse of their administrative function.”). 
33. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 409 (D. Del. 
2006) (describing allegations that Abbott Laboratories changed the formulation of a drug to prevent a 
generic drug from entering the marketplace). 
34. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 27, § 15.3 at 74.1. 
IYENGAR FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2015  11:04 AM 
254 MARQ. INTELL.  PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 19:2 
 
much to consumers, it can be sufficient to require a generic manufacturer to 
restart the ANDA filing process, delaying the date of generic entry, and 
triggering an entirely new round of patent litigation and thirty-month stays.35 
Product-hopping is therefore an effort by a brand firm “to manipulate the 
lag times inherent in the FDA’s generic-approval process in a way that, when 
combined with state drug substitution laws, excludes generic entry and the 
competition and lower prices that entry would bring.”36  Product-hopping 
delays generic competition in several ways.  First, where the branded drug’s 
patent is still in force, product hopping can prompt a whole new set of 
litigation-triggered thirty-month stays.37  Second, by making trivial 
modifications to its branded product, the brand firm can require its generic 
rival to start the ANDA process all over again, repeating the same 180-day 
(and usually longer) FDA review.38  “Third, product-hopping prevents 
pharmacists from substituting generic versions according to state substitution 
laws until the generic’s new ANDA is approved.”39  If the brand firm has 
pulled its old product from pharmacy shelves and convinced doctors to write 
scripts for its new product, the market for the generic collapses.40  Thus, the 
generic cannot compete because under state substitution laws, pharmacists 
may only prescribe generic alternatives when the FDA certifies them as 
bioequivalent.41  If doctors only prescribe the new version of the branded 
drug, generics must await completion of the ANDA approval process to even 
be considered for substitution.42 
“Product-hopping therefore presents a paradigmatic case of a regulatory 
game. . . . [It] exploits the product-approval process precisely because of its 
exclusionary effects and converts it into a tool for suppressing competition.”43  
 
35. Id. 
36. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Dogan & Lemley, supra note 15, at 709; 
Hovenkamp et al., § 15.3, at 23–24). 
37. Id. (citing Dogan & Lemley at 711–12). 
38. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
39. Id. (citing Carrier, supra note 28, at 1017–18 (discussing how product reformulations 
further delay generics’ attempts to achieve bioequivalence, sometimes by years); Hovenkamp et. al., 
supra note 28, § 15.3, at 25 (“until the ANDA for that new product is approved . . . state laws limit 
the ability of pharmacists to substitute the ‘old’ generic for the ‘new” branded drug.”)). 
40. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 712); 
Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 12, at 960 (stating that while the generic firm waits for its new 
ANDA approval it may still sell its version of the old drug, “but that is often small comfort because 
pharmacists cannot substitute the old drug for the new brand-name drug.”). 
41. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
42. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Carrier, supra note 28, at 1018); see also 
Hovenkamp et al., § 15.3, at 24 (citing Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 to reveal how product 
hopping creates anticompetitive effects by delaying generic substitution). 
43. Hovenkamp et al., § 15.3 at 25. 
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Without the FDA’s long approval process, generics could quickly enter the 
market with competing versions of branded drugs upon expiration of a 
patent.44  “But the regulatory framework prevents them from doing so, and the 
ability of branded-drug firms to exploit Hatch-Waxman and force generics 
into multiple ANDAs before they can reach the market powerfully excludes 
such competition.”45  As Professor Hovenkamp describes the problem, 
“product-hopping seems clearly to be an effort to game the rather intricate 
FDA rules. . . . The patentee is making a product change with no 
technological benefit solely in order to delay competition.”46 
II. WARNER CHILCOTT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
In this section, I describe the relevant facts and procedural history of the 
Mylan case, and then discuss the district court’s decision and reasoning. 
A. Mylan’s Complaint 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals’s complaint alleges that Warner Chilcott engaged 
in a conscious strategy to prevent or delay generic competition for the 
company’s branded Doryx medication by executing at least three distinct 
product hops: (1) first from a capsule to a tablet; (2) then from 75 mg and 
100 mg tablets to a single 150 mg dosage strength; and finally (3) from a 
single-scored version of the 150 mg tablet to a dual-scored version.47  
“[T]hese switches,” the complaint alleges, provided “little or no therapeutic 
benefit to consumers,” but “devastated the market for the prior versions of 
Doryx.”48  The defendant ceased marketing the old versions of its drug and 
eventually withdrew it from the market, thereby “forc[ing] generic 
manufacturers such as Mylan to change their products in development” in an 
effort to align their generic offerings with the newly promoted version of the 
branded drug.49 
B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
In moving to dismiss, Warner Chilcott argued that Mylan’s claims implied 
that brand firms have a duty to continue promoting outdated formulations to 
 
44. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 7. 
45. Id.; see also Hovenkamp et al., § 15.3, at 23–24. 
46. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, § 15.3, at 75. 
47. Royall, supra note 5, at 74 (citing Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at ¶¶ 2–5, Mylan 
Pharms. v. Warner Chilcott, Pub. Co. (No. 03824) (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2012) [hereinafter Mylan 
Complaint]).  
48. Royall, supra note 5, at 74–75 (citing Mylan Complaint ¶¶ 2, 9). 
49. Id. 
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permit generic competitors to take advantage of automatic substitution laws.50  
But nothing in the antitrust laws suggests that such a duty either does or 
should exist.51  Warner Chilcott further argued that antitrust law suggests that 
this type of “free riding” is “‘the antithesis of competition.’”52 
Warner Chilcott also maintained that Mylan’s complaint alleged nothing 
more than “innovation by the defendants, and the marketing of those 
innovations once government approvals were obtained.”53  Because neither 
the Sherman Act nor state drug substitution laws impose a duty on a firm to 
assist a rival with the firm’s innovations, Mylan’s claims that were based on 
“the timing and speed of Warner Chilcott’s innovation” should be 
dismissed.54  Finally, the Defendant used its motion to make a pointed attack 
against Mylan and its generic business model.55  “In the opening paragraphs 
of [its] motion, [Warner Chilcott] contended that Mylan is one of the world’s 
largest pharmaceutical companies, fully twice the size of Warner Chilcott, and 
that the company has ample resources to actively promote its generic products 
without relying entirely on state substitution laws, if it so chose.”56 
C. The Court’s Order 
On June 11, 2013, U.S. District Judge Paul S. Diamond in Pennsylvania 
denied Warner Chilcott’s motion to dismiss, saying the motion was 
premature.57  The court stated that the antitrust allegations against Warner 
Chilcott, raised by Mylan and retailers such as Walgreen and Safeway, were 
sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss at this early stage in the litigation.58 
 
50. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Warner Chilcott’s Motion to Dismiss at 
16, Mylan Pharms. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 03824 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter 
Warner Chilcott Motion to Dismiss] (“Plaintiffs argue that Defendants owed Mylan a duty to 
continue marketing older versions of Doryx, so that Mylan’s generic Doryx could be automatically 
substituted for Doryx prescriptions and Mylan would take the sale.”). 
51. Id. at 1 (stating that “the Sherman Act certainly does not impose a duty on Defendants to 
assist a larger rival, Mylan, with its innovations.”). 
52. Id. at 23–24 (stating that “antitrust law recognizes the peril of free riders and the 
legitimate business concern of avoiding the free rider problem.”) (citations omitted).  
53. Id. at 1. 
54. Id. (stating that “[p]laintiffs allege that Defendants improved their anti-acne products too 
quickly.  But rapid innovation is the lifeblood of competition, and Defendants’ outpacing of Mylan 
cannot provide grounds for an antitrust action. . . .”). 
55. Id. at 3 (stating that “Mylan is the third largest generic and specialty pharmaceuticals 
company in the world, in terms of revenue, reporting $6.13 billion in total revenues in 2011 . . . 
Mylan markets a global portfolio of approximately 1,100 different products.”) (citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
56. Royall, supra note 5, at 75 (citations omitted). 
57. Mylan Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that “[p]laintiffs’ 
allegations are sufficient to survive Defendants’ Rule 12 Motions.”). 
58. Id. 
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The court expressed skepticism, however, toward Mylan’s claims that 
Warner Chilcott tried to ward off competition by switching the market from 
Doryx tablets to Doryx capsules so pharmacists would not be able to 
substitute in generics automatically.  “Although I am skeptical that the 
‘product hopping’ alleged here constitutes anti-competitive conduct under the 
Sherman Act, I cannot definitively address that question without going 
beyond the pleadings,” the court said.59  “Accordingly, I will deny defendants’ 
motions to dismiss without prejudice.  They may renew these arguments at 
summary judgment.”60 
Moreover, the court stated that “[d]efendants’ contentions, if correct, 
appear compelling.”61 
I agree that plaintiffs’ theory here is ‘novel’ at best.  Nevertheless, 
defendants’ arguments require me to consider ‘facts’ that are well 
outside the complaints in this matter.  I am not prepared to consider 
these facts at the Rule 12 stage.62 
While the court’s order may comfort brand firms who oppose antitrust 
scrutiny of regulatory gaming in general and product hopping in particular, it 
“does little to clarify the law.”63 Because the court placed no reliance on the 
only two pharmaceutical product hopping cases to date that have resulted in 
substantive court decisions,64 the validity of the approaches adopted by those 
prior decisions is now unclear.  Moreover, the court’s dismissive stance on the 
dangers of product hopping can have grave consequences for consumers, 
health care plans, and the government if the court rules in favor of Warner 
Chilcott at the upcoming summary judgment stage.  The public has come to 
rely on Hatch-Waxman’s effectiveness in expediting the entry of generics to 
market and the lower prices that entry brings.  Allowing brand firms to 
continue regulatory gaming of Hatch-Waxman using product hopping 
undermines that effectiveness. 
 
59. Id.  
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Royall, supra note 5, at 75. 
64. Royall, supra note 5, at 72 (The first of these cases involved the cholesterol drug 
TriCor24, Abbott Labs v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006) (denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss), and the other involved the heartburn medications Prilosec and 
Nexium25, Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008) (granting 
defendant’s motion to dismiss).  The two cases dealt with mirror image facts and led to opposite 
conclusions, one denying a motion to dismiss and the other granting dismissal.). 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND FOR REGULATORY GAMING IN PHARMACEUTICALS 
The Hatch-Waxman legislation has led to an enormous amount of 
antitrust litigation.65  The most prevalent suits have centered around claims 
that brand firms have (1) improperly invoked Hatch-Waxman 30-month stays 
through “sham” patent litigation;66 and (2) essentially “conspired” with their 
generic rivals through “pay-for-delay” patent settlements to forestall the onset 
of generic competition.67 
A. Patent Settlements 
Patent settlement agreements or reverse-payment settlements between 
brand firms and generic manufacturers have taken place to delay the entry of 
generic products into the market.  They involve a payment from the brand 
firm to the generic manufacturer in exchange for delayed entry into the 
market.68  In the 2013 case, FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme Court questioned 
whether it was illegal for brand firms to use reverse payment settlements to 
keep generic competitors out of the market, even if the brand firm held a 
patent on the drug.69  While the Court did not hold such settlements 
presumptively illegal, five members of the Court declared that the FTC could 
not be prevented from bringing an antitrust suit against the Defendant.70  The 
Court lamented that “payment in return for staying out of the market . . . 
simply keeps prices at patentee-set levels,” which leads to gains for the 
patentee and challenger and losses for the consumer.71 
However, the dissent in Actavis rejected the application of antitrust law, 
arguing that it was a “novel approach” and “without any support in any 
statute.”72  It is interesting to note how similar this language in the Actavis 
dissent is to Judge Diamond’s language in Mylan.73  The dissenting opinion in 
Actavis further argued that only when a patent holder acts beyond the scope of 
 
65. Royall, supra note 5, at 72 (citations omitted). 
66. See M. Sean Royall & Joshua Lipton, The Complexities of Litigating Generic Drug 
Exclusion Claims in the Antitrust Class Action Context, 24.2 ANTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 22. 
67. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013). 
68. Id. at 2227. 
69. Id. at 2229. 
70. Id. at 2237 (stating that “a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with it 
the risk of significant anticompetitive effects . . . a court, by examining the size of the payment, may 
well be able to assess its likely anticompetitive effects along with its potential justifications without 
litigating the validity of the patent . . .”). 
71. Michael Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17 (2014), forthcoming 
(citing Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2235). 
72. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2238 (dissenting opinion) (stating that “[a] patent carves out an 
exception to the applicability of antitrust laws.”). 
73. See id. at 2238–47; Mylan Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1. 
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its granted monopoly should antitrust scrutiny be applicable.74  The danger of 
Mylan following the Actavis dissent is that while there was no patent at issue 
in Mylan, product hopping can have serious anticompetitive consequences 
when used to game the Hatch-Waxman system when a patent is indeed in 
force.  For example, Hatch-Waxman encourages generic manufacturers to file 
an ANDA when they believe the patent on the branded drug is invalid.75  In 
such a case, product hopping followed by 30-month stays can delay generic 
entry indefinitely even when the patent is invalid, effectively defeating the 
very purpose of the patent system.76 
While the law related to reverse-payment settlements is reasonably well 
settled since Actavis, product-hopping allegations—the latest antitrust 
outgrowth of Hatch-Waxman—are a relatively recent phenomenon, and the 
law remains very much in flux.77 
B. Product Hopping Caselaw 
Prior to Mylan, there were only two pharmaceutical product-hopping 
cases that resulted in court decisions.78  From those two, it is possible to infer 
that antitrust claims based on product-hopping turns largely on the strength of 
the facts, especially whether the brand firm withdrew its prior formulation 
from the marketplace and limited consumer choice.79 
First, in Abbott Labs, the plaintiff asserted that Abbott changed its 
formulation for its branded drug TriCor24 twice, strategically timed to thwart 
imminent generic competition.80  Teva alleged that Abbott not only stopped 
selling the prior versions, but also removed them from the National Drug Data 
File (NDDF),81 a private database of FDA-approved drugs.82  This effectively 
prevented pharmacies from filling prescriptions for the superseded versions or 
 
74. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2238–39. 
75. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
76. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (stating that “[t]he Congress shall have power to . . . promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”). 
77. Royall, supra note 5, at 72. 
78. Id. at 72–3 (citing Abbott Labs v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 
2006); Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
79. Id. at 72–73. 
80. Id. at 73 (citing Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 416–17). 
81. The NDDF plus (now known as FDB MedKnowledge) guides pharmacists in determining 
substitution.  It is the most widely relied upon drug knowledge base in the United States and Canada.  
It is integrated within healthcare information systems serving hospitals, physician practices, and 
retail pharmacies, and enables solutions that range from e-prescribing and pharmacy dispensing to 
drug pricing analysis.  FDB MedKnowledge (NDDF), http://www.fdbhealth.com/fdb-medknowledge 
(last visited Feb 2, 2015). 
82. Royall, supra note 5, at 73 (citing Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 416–17). 
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any generic equivalents.83  The Abbott Labs court rejected Abbott’s arguments 
that a product change which introduces an improvement is per se lawful under 
antitrust considerations.84  The court determined that dismissal was 
inappropriate, because of the allegations that Abbott removed the prior drug 
formulations from the market and changed the NDDF codes.85  “[S]uch 
conduct,” the court declared, “results in consumer coercion” and “is 
potentially anticompetitive.”86 
Second, in Walgreen v. AstraZeneca, Walgreen alleged that AstraZeneca 
began aggressively promoting a newly approved prescription heartburn 
medication, Nexium, just as its longstanding heartburn drug, Prilosec, was 
nearing the end of its patent protection and beginning to face generic 
competition.87  However, although AstraZeneca began marketing Nexium to 
doctors, it did not withdraw Prilosec from the market.  In granting 
AstraZeneca’s motion to dismiss, the Walgreen court relied on the reasoning 
in Abbott Labs, especially on the “critical factor” of consumer choice.88  
Because AstraZeneca had “added choices” by introducing a new drug to 
compete with its alternative drug, Prilosec, with generic substitutes to 
Prilosec, and with heartburn medications offered by other manufacturers, the 
product hop was not enough to support a monopolization complaint.89 
But in Mylan, the court puzzlingly departed from this precedent, raised 
fundamental questions about the merits of product-hopping allegations, and 
signaled skepticism whether a brand firm’s shift to a new formulation could 
ever constitute an antitrust violation.90  Therefore, the Mylan court’s order, 
when considered in the light of Abbott Labs and Walgreen, muddies the law 
on product hopping, leaving many questions unanswered. 
IV. MANIPULATION OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
In this Part, I first examine whether Warner Chilcott’s contention that 
Mylan sought to free-ride on the Defendant’s innovations is truly 
 
83. Id. 
84. Id. (citing Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 420). 
85. Id. 
86. Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 424.   
87. Royall, supra note 5, at 74 (citing Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. 
Supp. 2d 146, 148 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
88. Id. (citing Walgreen, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 151). 
89. Walgreen, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 152 (stating that “[t]he fact that a new product siphoned off 
some of the sales from the old product and, in turn, depressed sales of the generic substitutes for the 
old product, does not create an antitrust cause of action.”). 
90. Royall, supra note 5, at 73. 
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“compelling.”91  Then, I discuss Warner Chilcott’s conduct in light of the 
Hatch-Waxman compromise.  Finally, I examine the district court’s order in 
light of the product hopping precedent, especially related to withdrawal of 
older branded-drug versions by brand firms. 
A.  Was Mylan’s Generic Entry Free-Riding? 
In its motion to dismiss, Warner Chilcott asserted that antitrust law does 
not impose a duty on brand firms to promote outdated formulations, such that 
generic manufacturers may take advantage of automatic substitution laws.92  
Warner Chilcott further described the generic business model as 
anticompetitive free-riding.93  And Judge Diamond, in his order denying the 
motion, stated that 
[i]n Defendants’ view, Plaintiffs’ allegation that generic firms cannot 
advertise their products to compete successfully with Doryx may 
reveal a problem with the generics’ business models or demonstrate 
the regulatory regimes’ inability to control generics’ costs through 
forced ‘free-riding’ . . . Defendants’ contentions, if correct, appear 
compelling.”94 
However, faster and cheaper generic entry is the intended result of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and state substitution laws; it is not, as Warner Chilcott 
asserted, somehow undesirable free-riding.95 What Warner Chilcott 
characterized as free-riding by generics is in fact the mechanism for 
introducing faster and more effective generic competition that Hatch-Waxman 
and state drug substitution laws have deliberately created.96 
“As the Supreme Court recently recognized, Hatch-Waxman’s 
abbreviated approval procedures allow generics to ‘obtain approval while 
 
91. Mylan Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that “[i]n Defendants’ 
view, Plaintiffs’ allegation . . . demonstrate the regulatory regimes’ inability to control generics’ 
costs through forced “free-riding” . . . Defendants’ contentions, if correct, appear compelling.”). 
92. Id. at 23. 
93. Id. (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court’s antitrust case law has recognized the legitimate 
concerns of manufacturers in avoiding the ‘free rider’ effect.”)  
94. Id. at 3. 
95. Id. at 23. 
96. FTC Amicus, supra note 10, at 7.  Hatch-Waxman was intended to expedite the system 
for approval of generic drugs by the FDA that the House Report described as “too cumbersome and 
expensive.”  Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 7 n.30 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), Pt. 1, supra 
note 14, at p.5 (1984)).  The House Judiciary Committee estimated that there were 150 drug products 
approved after 1962 that were off-patent, but for which no generics existed.  Generics for these 
branded drugs would become available using the ANDA procedure.  Professors Amicus, supra note 
8, at 7 n.30 (citation omitted). 
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avoiding “the costly and time-consuming studies”’ needed for a pioneer drug 
and let generics ‘piggy-back on the pioneer’s approval efforts, “speed[ing] the 
introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market” . . . thereby furthering drug 
competition.’”97 
Further, the Hatch-Waxman framework positions generics as low-cost 
alternatives that “[should] not [have to] compete with the promotional efforts 
of brand firms.”98  “State drug substitution laws eliminate the need for 
generics to undertake financially crippling marketing costs that could prevent 
generic viability.”99  The facilitated generic entry and enabled point-of sale 
generic substitution is hardly free-riding.  It was deemed important by 
Congress to facilitate quicker public access to affordable medicines.100  “The 
combined mechanism for facilitated generic entry and substitution also solves 
the price disconnect between ‘prescribing doctors, who are not directly 
responsive to drug pricing, and paying insurers and consumers, who do not 
directly select the prescribed drug.’”101  “As a result, drugs are much cheaper 
and more widely available today.”102  Without these laws, generics would be 
unable to compete cost-effectively.  Far from free-riding, “the ability of 
generics to succeed in the market without equivalent approval processes and 
marketing expenses is precisely the sort of procompetitive ‘piggy-backing’ . . 
. these laws carefully facilitate.”103 
 
97. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 7 (citing Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2228 (citations 
omitted)). 
98. FTC Amicus, at 10; see H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), at Pt. 1, p. 4 (1984) (stating that 
Congress enacted Hatch-Waxman to allow generics to compete via “following on” branded drugs 
because other paths to get generics to market are not cost-effective). 
99. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 8.  For example, Pennsylvania’s drug substitution law 
states that its purpose is to “permit consumers to secure necessary drugs at the most economical 
costs.” Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 8 n.32 (citing 35 PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 960.1 (2014)). 
100. Mylan Pharmaceutical’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss 
at 7–8, Mylan (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Mylan Opposition] (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. 
v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A central purpose of the Hatch-
Waxman Act . . . is ‘to enable competitors to bring cheaper, generic . . . drugs to market as quickly as 
possible.’”) (quoting 149 Cong. Rec. S15885 (Nov. 25, 2003))). 
101. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 8 (citing Carrier, supra note 29, at 1017 (stating that 
in particular, drug substitution laws “carve out a role for pharmacists, who are much more sensitive 
to prices than doctors.”)). 
102. Id. at 8 n.34. The first generic to enter the market is typically 20% to 30% cheaper than 
the branded drug.  Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 8 n.34.  Subsequent generic entry creates 
greater price competition, with discounts of 85% or more off the price of the branded drug.  Id.  A 
recent study of 5.6 million prescriptions revealed that patients and their insurance plans respectively 
paid an average of $17.90 and $26.67 for generic drugs and an average of $49.50 and $158.25 for 
branded drugs where no generic existed.  Id. (citing FTC Amicus, supra note 10, at 7 (internal 
citations omitted)). 
103. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 8. 
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B. The Effect of Product Hopping on the Hatch-Waxman Compromise 
The proponents of the Hatch-Waxman legislation urged its adoption as the 
best possible compromise between the competing economic interests of 
patentees and generic manufacturers.104  On the one hand, Hatch-Waxman 
allowed generic manufacturers, such as Mylan, expedited entry to the 
market.105  “Rather than submitting full safety and efficacy data to the FDA, a 
generic manufacturer can now obtain much faster and cheaper approval by 
filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), which certifies the 
bioequivalence of its generic to an existing branded drug.”106  Hatch-Waxman 
requires that the FDA complete its ANDA review within 180 days (but 
sometimes it can take longer).107  On the other hand, Hatch-Waxman extended 
the terms of certain drug patents “create[ing] incentives for increased research 
expenditures” by patentees.108 
“This compromise was designed to facilitate the introduction of low-cost 
generic[s] into the market for the benefit of consumers, health care plans, and 
the government.”109  The very nature of the highly regulated market 
necessitated the compromise.110  “In a different industry like automobiles for 
example, there would be no need for similar provisions because—unlike the 
FDA—there is no government regulatory agency that would delay marketing 
of a new product after patent expiry.”111 
Here, because Warner Chilcott reformulated (but did not improve) Doryx, 
and then withdrew the existing formulation from the market allegedly to 
impede generic substitution, its conduct deprived the public of the benefits of 
 
104. Id. at 4–5 (citing Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 12, at 947 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act 
gave additional protection to the inventors of new drugs, both by lengthening patent terms and by 
providing guaranteed terms of data exclusivity.  In exchange, Hatch-Waxman made it easier for 
generic drug manufacturers to enter the market with a copy of the drug.”)). 
105. H.R. Rep., supra note 14, at 5 (1984) (stating that “H.R. 3605 provides that a generic 
manufacturer may request FDA approval to begin marketing before the patent on the drug has 
expired.”). 
106. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 4–5 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)).   
107. See Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION’S GENERIC DRUG REVIEW PROCESS, 13 (2008), available at 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-07-00280.pdf (noting that the FDA review process for 
ANDAs often exceeds the 180-day statutory maximum). 
108. Congress noted in the legislative history that “[i]n most cases the bill affords greater 
protection for patent holders than current law.” H.R. Rep., supra note 14, at p. 10 (1984). 
109. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 5 (citing H.R. Rep., supra note 9, at p. 9 (1984) 
(stating that the Hatch-Waxman Act was designed to “implement the policy objective of getting safe 
and effective generic substitutes on the market as quickly as possible after the expiration of the 
patent.”)). 
110. Professors Amicus, supra note 8, at 5 (citing H.R. Rep., supra note 9, at p. 30 (1984)). 
111. Id.  
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the Hatch-Waxman compromise.  Moreover, the Defendant appears to have 
enhanced the anticompetitive effects of its product hopping strategy by 
precisely timing the introduction of scoring on the tablets in order to erect 
barriers to generic entry.112  In fact, Warner Chilcott’s internal documents 
appear to admit to an “anti-generic strategy” meant to increase profits at the 
expense of the public and third-party payers.113  Therefore, because Warner 
Chilcott’s product hopping deprived the public of the pro-competitive goals of 
the Hatch-Waxman compromise, it should be liable to antitrust scrutiny. 
C. Withdrawal of Older Branded Versions in Mylan 
Finally, the intended goals of Hatch-Waxman and state substitution laws 
are thwarted when brand firms engage in product-hopping strategies involving 
withdrawal of the branded product from the market.  “When a brand [is] 
withdrawn, there can be no generic substitution because there is no product 
for which the generic can be substituted.”114  By discontinuing its existing 
versions of Doryx, Warner Chilcott reduced, rather than expanded, consumer 
choice.  A similar reduction in consumer choice was deemed critical by the 
court in Abbott Labs: “[H]ere, according to Plaintiffs, consumers were not 
presented with a choice between [] formulations. Instead, Defendants 
allegedly prevented such a choice by removing the old formulations from the 
market while introducing new formulations.”115 
The Abbott Labs court’s rationale “was also essential to the court’s 
decision in Walgreen [], in which AstraZeneca introduced Nexium, but did 
not remove Prilosec from the market or seek to prohibit generic substitution 
of Prilosec.”116  The Walgreen court distinguished Abbott Labs on the facts, 
explaining that there was “no allegation that AstraZeneca eliminated any 
consumer choices.  Rather, AstraZeneca added choices.”117 
In Mylan, Warner Chilcott appears to have reduced competitive choices to 
Doryx by removing prior formulations of the drug as well as by suppressing 
generic competition.118  In fact, Professor Hovenkamp also notes that the 
 
112. Mylan Complaint at ¶¶57–60. 
113. Id. at  ¶¶47–49.  In discussing the hop from capsules to tablets, the Defendant’s internal 
documents reveal that “[t]he tablet is to be used as an anti-generic strategy” and that “[i]t is [Warner 
Chilcott’s] intention to discontinue the Doryx capsule as soon as the tablet is available to eliminate 
generic competition.”  Id. at ¶49. 
114. Mylan Opposition, supra note 100, at 8. 
115. Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
116. Mylan Opposition at 21 (citing Walgreen, 534 F. Supp. 2d 146). 
117. Walgreen, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 151. 
118. Mylan Opposition, supra note 100, at 22 (citing Hovenkamp et al., supra note 27, § 15.3 
at 77 (stating that “ ‘[U]nlike Abbott [Labs], AstraZeneca did not withdraw Prilosec from the market 
or seek to prohibit generic substitution of Prilosec. . . . Walgreen represents a case in which the 
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decisive anticompetitive act in Abbott Labs was the same as here: withdrawal 
of older versions after the introduction of reformulations with little or no 
patient benefit.119 
However, unlike in Abbott Labs, in Mylan, the Plaintiff did not allege that 
Warner Chilcott changed NDDF codes in a manner that might prevent generic 
substitution.120 “In fact, the complaint appears to acknowledge that Mylan 
successfully developed and at least initially launched several generic 
formulations.”121  From the court’s order in Mylan, it appears therefore that 
Judge Diamond may have distinguished Abbott Labs in giving judicial 
deference to a pharmaceutical product shift that did not openly disrupt 
consumer choice by changing NDDF codes.122  But the borders of this NDDF 
safe harbor to antitrust scrutiny of product hopping are not well defined.123  
For example, under Abbott Labs, it is unclear whether a brand firm could 
successfully win dismissal if the challenged formulation change was not 
accompanied by a change in NDDF codes.124  Moreover, it is not clear 
whether there would be grounds for dismissal if the prior formulation was not 
removed from the market.125 
Had Judge Diamond followed the approach of Abbott Labs and Walgreen, 
he might have considered the Defendant’s alleged decisions to phase out prior 
formulations and the extent to which this deprived consumers of choices.126  
But the Mylan court made no mention of these concepts in its order denying 
Warner Chilcott’s motion to dismiss.127  The court instead summarized the 
Defendant’s principal arguments for dismissal, including claims that “their 
product changes . . . did nothing to block generic firms from competing” but 
“merely precluded generic firms from taking advantage of automatic 
 
patentee introduced a new product but did not take advantage of the regulatory scheme to interfere 
with the introduction of a generic drug by the patent challenger.’”)). 
119. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 22, § 15.3 at 74.1. 
120. Royall, supra note 5, at 75.  
121. Id. (citing Mylan Complaint at ¶32). 
122. Id. at 73.  
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id.  Another open question left by Abbott Labs and Mylan are whether it would be 
enough for a plaintiff to defeat dismissal if it alleged that the prior formulation, while still available, 
was no longer being actively marketed by the brand firm. Id.  Finally, is there another variation of 
alleged coercion, besides withdrawing support for old branded versions that a plaintiff could argue 
interferes with “free choice” in this context?. Id. (stating that Abbott Labs “provides no real answers 
to these questions, which is somewhat troubling, considering that it offers the most detailed judicial 
commentary to date on this subject.”). 
126. Id. at 75. 
127. Id. 
IYENGAR FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2015  11:04 AM 
266 MARQ. INTELL.  PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 19:2 
 
substitution laws.”128  “This was, to say the least, a marked departure from 
Walgreen and Abbott Labs.”129 
While the Mylan court’s dismissal decision may send a promising sign to 
brand firms who oppose antitrust scrutiny of product hopping, it does little to 
clarify the law.  In fact, the dramatically different tone struck by the court’s 
decision, making no reference to the Defendant’s withdrawal of its previous 
drug versions, in comparison to Abbott Labs and Walgreen poses a serious 
challenge to the formation of a judicial consensus.130  Finally, the use of the 
terms “‘novel’ at best” and fails to state “an antitrust injury”131 to characterize 
Mylan’s product-hopping theory portends grave consequences for public 
access to low-cost generics and Congress’s pro-competitive intent in enacting 
Hatch-Waxman if the court ultimately does not consider Mylan’s antitrust 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the FDA has no authority to consider competition issues in its 
regulatory activities and does not review product changes for anything other 
than safety and efficacy,132 courts must step in.  This is in contrast to regulated 
industries, such as telecommunications, where regulations provide for 
competition concerns.133  In the pharmaceuticals industry, however, brand 
firms can make small modifications to their products and then “withdraw the 
earlier [versions], which forces the ANDA applicant to restart the application 
process in order to secure an AB rating.”134  The FDA’s regulations can 
therefore be easily gamed by brand firms to anticompetitive effect.135 
In Mylan, the determination of whether the Defendant’s product hopping 
was exclusionary would be properly evaluated under the antitrust rule of 
 
128. Id. (citing Mylan Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 2–3). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 75. 
131. Mylan Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 3. 
132. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (enumerating factors agency may consider in product approval); 
see generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 709 (stating that “[The FDA] has neither the 
mandate nor the power to take competition concerns into account in approving particular 
pharmaceutical products.”). 
133. Mylan Opposition, supra note 100, at 9 (citing Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 405–06 (2004) (describing competition regulations in 
telecommunications)). 
134. Id. (citing Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 420-24; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 14, at 
709–17). 
135. Id. (citing In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 522, 530–31 (D.N.J. 2004); 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 709 (“The pharmaceutical industry presents a perfect storm for 
regulatory gaming.”). 
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reason.136  In fact, as the Abbott Labs court held: “[p]laintiffs are not required 
to prove that the new formulations were absolutely no better than the prior 
version or that the only purpose of the innovation was to eliminate [a rival] 
product of a rival. . . . if [p]laintiffs show anticompetitive harm from the 
formulation changes, that harm will be weighed against any benefits presented 
by Defendants.”137  The Mylan court should therefore subject Warner 
Chilcott’s product hopping strategy to antitrust scrutiny at the upcoming 
summary judgment stage. 
 
 
136. Mylan Opposition, supra note 100, at 20 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
137. Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
